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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
URIEL CHAVEZ-ESPINOZA,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

Case No. 20061090-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of one count of aggravated burglary, a first
degree felony; one count of aggravated assault, a second degree felony; and three counts
of simple assault, a class A misdemeanor, in the Fourth Judicial District, Wasatch
County, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (West 2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was the guilty verdict on aggravated burglary inconsistent with another verdict,
and, if so, does the inconsistency require a reversal?
Standard of review. Where a defendant argues that a verdict of guilty on one
count is inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty on another count, the question on review
is simply whether the evidence suffices to support the guilty verdict. State v. Stewart,
729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986).

2. Can defendant establish that the trial court plainly erred in giving a jury
instruction where he affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objection
to it? Was trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the instruction below?
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to the first question. "An
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a
question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162.
3. Where defendant, without reason, failed to maintain contact with his trial
counsel, was counsel ineffective for not more fully consulting with defendant in his
preparations for trial?
Standard of review. See standard for issue 2, above.
4. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of
the State's case?
Standard of review. The grant or denial "of a motion to dismiss is a question of
law [that] [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the
decision of the trial court." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^f 17, 70 P.3d 111 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
5. Did the evidence regarding the aggravated burglary count suffice to support the
jury's guilty verdict?
Standard of review. When reviewing a jury verdict, an appellate court "review[s]
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,115, 63 P.3d 94.
The court "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
2

evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." Id. (citation omitted).
6. Where a defendant does not demonstrate that a biased juror sat, can he prevail
on his claims that the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying a motion to
strike a juror for cause?
Standard of review. "Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. When reviewing such a ruling, [the appellate
court] reverse[s] only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Finlayson, 956
P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah App.
1994)) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted). "If a defendant
believes the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror for cause, in order to preserve the
error on appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is
available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause." Id. (quoting State v.
Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997)). Moreover, "[e]ven if the trial court has
erroneously granted or denied a challenge for cause, . . . to prevail on a claim of error . . .
a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial
or incompetent." Id. (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 400 (Utah 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Defendant claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Is this claim timely?

3

Standard of review. The timeliness of a challenge to the composition of a jury—
whether to the venire or to the selected jury—is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39,ffi[11, 35, 140 P.3d 1219.
8. Should the trial court have sua sponte granted a mistrial when, upon
questioning by defense counsel, a witness stated that he was afraid because defendant had
threatened his family members?
Standard of review. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an
error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that
the error was prejudicial. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, f 41, 82 P.3d 1106.
9. Where defendant affirmatively approved the jury instructions, may he now
argue that the trial court plainly erred for not instructing on a lesser included offense of
trespassing?
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this claim.
10. Should this Court grant defendant's request that it reconsider its earlier denial
of his rule 23B motion for remand, where defendant provides no legal or factual support
for his request?
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this claim.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-2-202 (West 2004);
§ 76-3-203.1 (West 2004);
§ 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2006);
§ 76-6-203 (West 2004).

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004); one count of child abuse,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (West Supp. 2005); one
count of aggravated assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (West 2004); and four counts of assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004). R15-17. In addition, the State charged him
on all counts with criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, subjecting him to
criminal liability under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004). Id. The State also
charged defendant with committing all the offenses in concert with two or more persons,
subjecting him to enhanced penalties for group criminal activity under the Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2006), commonly known as the gang enhancement
statute. Id.
A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and
three counts of assault. See Rl 65-69. The jury found that defendant acted in concert
with two or more persons in committing all of these offenses. See id. The jury found
defendant not guilty of child abuse and not guilty on one count of assault. On November
17, 2006, the trial court imposed judgment, sentencing defendant to a prison term of
9 years to life on the aggravated burglary count; a concurrent prison term of 1 to 15 years
on the aggravated assault count; and concurrent jail terms of 60 days on each of the
assault counts. Rl 88-89.
Defendant timely appealed. R196.
5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime
The victims in this case were Adrian Ramirez and his family members, including
his brother Jorge Ramirez. See Rl 5-17; 165-69. The perpetrators were defendant, who
was Adrian's cousin, and defendant's friends—Jorge Urias; Genaro Velasquez, also
known as "Angel"; Miguel Flores, also know as "La Borrega" or "the sheep"; and
another male known as "La Diabla." R204:26-29; State's Exhibit 2.
On December 24, 2005, defendant arranged for his cousin, Adrian Ramirez, to
purchase cocaine from defendant's friend, Jorge Urias. R204:13. Adrian purchased $20
worth of cocaine on behalf of another cousin, Jose Luis Ramirez. R204:14; State's
Exhibit 2. At some point, Jose Luis decided to return the cocaine "[b]ecause it did not
work." R204:15. Jorge Urias returned Jose Luis's money. Id. The return of the cocaine
resulted in the criminal episode for which defendant was charged. Id.
On December 31, 2005, New Year's Eve, Adrian was at home with his brother,
Jorge Ramirez, and Jose Luis. R204:18. Around 3:00 a.m. on January 1, 2006, Jorge
Ramirez woke Adrian to tell him that defendant had just telephoned and was on the line.
R204:19. When Adrian took the phone, defendant told Adrian that "[h]e was going to
f

us all." R204:20. When Adrian asked why, defendant said it was because the

cocaine had been returned to Jorge Urias. Id. Defendant told Adrian to "Come over here
to Park City so that I can f

you and your brother." R204:21. Adrian told defendant

that he "didn't want to fight with him." Id. Defendant became more angry, and Adrian
hungup. R204:22. Adrian went back to bed. Id.
6

Sometime after 3:45 a.m., someone knocked on the door of Adrian's family's
apartment. R204:23. When Adrian opened the door, defendant thrust his fist into the
apartment and hit Adrian. R204:24-25. Defendant had four friends with him—Jorge
Urias, "Angel," "La Borrega," and "La Diabla." R204:29; State's Exhibit 2. La Borrega
stepped inside and pulled Adrian out of the apartment and into the hallway. R204:26-27;
State's Exhibit 2. Jorge Urias, Angel, and La Diabla, all carrying broken bottles, entered
the apartment and began fighting with Jorge Ramirez and Jose Luis. R204:105.
After La Borrega pulled Adrian into the hallway, defendant hit Adrian on the face
about seven times. R204:27-28. At some point, Adrian's brother Jorge Ramirez, his
cousin Jose Luis, and defendant's friends came out the door, and "all of them [began]
fighting." R204:30. Defendant's friends were also hitting Adrian. Id. Adrian broke
away and "went running to the parking lot," where he hid underneath a truck. R204:3035. Back in the hallway, Angel used a bottle to cut Jorge Ramirez three times.
R204:lll.
Fiorina Chavez, Adrian's mother, stepped out into the hallway, trying to separate
the fighters. R204:113. She said to defendant, "Go on home, son. What are you doing
fighting? It's too late." Id. Then Ruben Ramirez, Adrian's father, stepped outside.
R204:l 14. He "was able to separate [his] family from [defendant] and [defendant's]
friends," R204:115. As he stepped back with his family, Jorge Urias was "waving the
switchblade at [him]." Id.
Ruben continued backing up, keeping his family behind him and holding his arms
spread out. R204:116. Jorge Urias continued to flash his knife, and defendant yelled that
7

"he was going to f

[Jorge Ramirez] up." R204:117. Defendant said to Jorge, "I'm

going to kill you, dog." Id.
After he had backed the family into the home, Ruben and the family members
slammed the door closed. Id. Defendant and his friends were on the other side, "pushing
hard . . . [and] kicking on the door." Id. Eventually, defendant and his friends stopped
pushing the door. R204:118.
Defendant left the hallway and went to the parking lot where he found Adrian
hiding under the truck. R204:36. After defendant found Adrian, all of defendant's
friends "arrived" and "grabbed [Adrian] and all of them started hitting [him]." R204:37.
"[A] 11 five of them" joined in. R204:38. Defendant sat on Adrian's chest, holding him
down. Id. La Borrega held Adrian's feet down. Id. Defendant said, "You're going to
die, dog." R204:39. Defendant said, "Hand me the knife." Id. He continued, "Pass me
the knife, mother f

er." Id. Adrian could feel defendant sitting on his chest. R204:40.

Just before passing out, Adrian felt his head being cut. Id.
Back in the apartment, Jorge Ramirez realized that Adrian wasn't there.
R204:118. Jorge, his sister Berenice, and Jose Luis went outside to look for Adrian. Id.
Jorge's sister, Adalee, and his girlfriend, Rosa Solis, called the police. Id. Berenice and
Jose Luis found Adrian lying in the snow, unconscious. R204:119. Adrian was bleeding
heavily, he would not wake up, and his eyes had rolled back. Id. The family took Adrian
to the hospital. R204:121. On their way to the hospital, they passed defendant and his
friends driving in a small car, apparently slipping on the snow. Id.
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Adrian awoke in the hospital. R204:51. Among his injuries were a large gash and
some skin missing on the side of his head; bottle cuts on the neck, shoulder, chest; and a
bruise where he had been kicked in the ribs. R204:52-58. The cut to the head required
stitches and caused permanent scarring. R204:58.
Asked whether he knew of any reason for defendant's anger, other than Jorge
Ramirez's having returned the cocaine, Adrian testified, "I don't know. It might have
been his." R204:60.
Defendant's version
Defendant claimed that that his friend Jorge Urias told him that his cousins were
angry "because of [the] bad drugs that they said he sold them." R206:175. Defendant
claimed that he went with his friends to the Ramirez apartment, "trying to be a mediator,"
because he "wanted to fix the problem between them." R206:175-76.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant claims that the acquittal on the charge of simple assault against Rosa
Solis is inconsistent with the guilty verdict for aggravated burglary. This claim is
unpreserved. Defendant has not argued any exception to the preservation rules. This
Court should decline to review this claim. In any case, the two verdicts were not
inconsistent. Moreover, even if the two verdicts were inconsistent, the inconsistency
would not require reversal of defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary.
2. Defendant claims that the jury instructions did not adequately set forth the
elements of aggravated robbery and argues, specifically, that they did not set forth the
necessary intent. Defendant's claim is unpreserved. While he argues that this Court
9

should review his claim for manifest injustice, he affirmatively approved the jury
instructions below, thereby inviting the alleged error and foreclosing review for manifest
injustice. He also argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the instructions.
This claim fails, however, because the instructions accurately and adequately defined the
elements of aggravated burglary, including the necessary intent, and accurately set forth
the elements of the gang enhancement.
3. Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not maintaining contact
with him and not more fully consulting with him in preparation for trial. This claim fails
because the trial court found, and defendant does not dispute, that defendant was
responsible for the lack of contact.
4. Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss
the aggravated burglary count, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding that he intended to enter the apartment. He also argues that the evidence does not
support a finding that the aggravated burglary was committed in concert with two or
more persons. Defendant preserved only the first claim. The second claim is
unpreserved, and this court should decline review of that claim. Moreover, defendant has
not marshaled the evidence with respect to either claim. This court should therefore
assume the evidence supported the findings underlying the trial court's denial of his
motion. In any event, during its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that aggravated robbery and the gang enhancement had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

10

5. Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict
on the aggravated burglary count and the finding that defendant committed the felony in
concert with two or more others. Defendant has inadequately briefed this claim. He has
not indicated whether it was preserved below. It apparently was not. He has not argued
any exception to the preservation rule. He has not marshaled the evidence in support of
the jury findings or adequately briefed his claim. This Court should deny review of the
claim and/or assume that the evidence supported the jury's findings. In any case, the
evidence sufficed.
6. Defendant has not argued, much less demonstrated, that a biased juror sat. He
therefore cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting or denying any
challenge to a juror for cause.
7. Defendant's claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is untimely and lacks record support.
8. Defendant claims that the trial court should sua sponte have declared a mistrial
when a witness volunteered that defendant had threatened his family. This claim is
unpreserved. Defendant has not argued any exception to the preservation rule. He has
inadequately briefed his claim. For these reasons, this Court should deny review of his
claim. In any case, the trial court had no duty to sua sponte declare a mistrial. No
manifest necessity existed for a mistrial, and an alternative to a mistrial existed. Rather
than declare a mistrial, the trial court struck the volunteered testimony. In addition, the
jury instructions admonished the jury not to consider any evidence that was stricken.

11

9. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred for not sua sponte including a lesser
included instruction on criminal trespass is unpreserved. He has not argued any
exception to the preservation rule. Moreover, because defendant affirmatively approved
the instructions below, he invited any error, and review for plain error or manifest
injustice is therefore unavailable.
10. Defendant moved under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for
remand to the district court for findings necessary to a determination of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. This Court denied that motion, and defendant now asks the
Court to reconsider that denial. Because defendant has made no non-speculative
allegation of facts and has provided no legal support for his request for reconsideration,
the Court should deny it.

12

ARGUMENT
I.
THE GUILTY VERDICT FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY WAS
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACQUITTAL FOR SIMPLE
ASSAULT AGAINST ROSA SOLIS; BUT EVEN WHERE
VERDICTS ARE INCONSISTENT, THE INCONSISTENCY DOES
NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL
Defendant first claims that "the verdict of not guilty as to count 7 is inconsistent
with the aggravated burglary conviction and a new trial should be ordered." Appellant's
Br. at 21 (capitalization and boldface omitted).
A.

Defendant's claim is unpreserved. Moreover, because defendant has not
argued plain error or any other exception to the preservation rules, this
Court should not review his claim.
At the outset, defendant's claim fails because it is unpreserved and because he has

argued no exception to the preservation rules. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, an appellant is required to include in his brief a "citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or "a statement of grounds for
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)
& (B). "An issue is properly raised [and therefore preserved] in the trial court if: (1) the
issue is raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue is specifically raised; and (3) the issue is
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, f
56, 102 P.3d 774 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)).
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error
or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, *[} 13, 95
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P.3d 276 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346). A party seeking
review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the justification for review in the party's
opening brief." State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v.
Stevens, 2000 UT 98, *{ 9, 17 P.3d 1122). When a party fails to do so, an appellate court
may refuse to consider the unpreserved issue. Id. at ^ 50, 58 (refusing to consider
Pinder's unpreserved claims because he "failed to argue plain error or show exceptional
circumstances on appeal").
Here, as his "Citation to the Record" in connection with this claim, defendant
references the pages of the record that include the verdict forms. See Appellant's Br. at 2
(citing R154-158). The verdict forms do not show that any issue was raised, much less
that it was timely and specifically raised. Moreover, the verdict forms do not reference
any evidence or relevant legal support for a claim. Defendant's cite thus does not show
that any issue with respect to inconsistent verdicts was raised and preserved in the trial
court.1
Moreover, defendant has not argued any justification for review of his unpreserved
claim. The "inconsistent verdicts" claim is briefed on pages 21-23 of Appellant's Brief.
These pages do not mention "plain error" or any other exception to the preservation rule,
nor do they set forth an argument explaining why any exception should apply to this

1

Neither has the State in its review found any location in the record where
defendant preserved this claim.
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claim. Because defendant has not articulated a justification for review of his unpreserved
claim, this Court may decline to review it.
B.

The verdicts are not inconsistent.
Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim, the claim fails on the merits.

First, the verdicts are not inconsistent. The jury found defendant not guilty on count 7,
the charge of simple assault against Rosa Solis. R166. Defendant claims that the verdict
on count 7 is inconsistent with the guilty verdict on count 1, aggravated burglary.
Defendant claims that "the evidence as to entry into the premises was provided
substantially by Rosa Solis." Appellant's Br. at 21. Defendant continues, arguing that
the acquittal on the charge of simple assault against Rosa "is factually and legally
inconsistent with the Aggravated Burglary count and creates a factual
inconsistency. . . . if [Rosa] who testified that she was assaulted inside the residence
specifically by [defendant] was found by the jury not to have been assaulted inside the
residence, the jury should have also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find
[defendant] guilty of Aggravated Burglary." Id. at 22.
Defendant's claim is meritless. The jury instructions told the jury members that to
find defendant guilty of simple assault against Rosa, they must find that he attempted to
do bodily injury to Rosa, threatened to do bodily injury to Rosa, created a substantial risk
of bodily injury to Rosa, or caused bodily injury to Rosa. R148. The instructions told
them that to find defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, they must find the defendant
entered into a building with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault on any person,
and that in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing, the defendant or another
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participant in the crime caused bodily injury to any person, used or threatened the
immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person, or possessed or attempted to
use a dangerous weapon. R154.
The jury's acquittal on count 7 meant only that the jury did not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant attempted or threatened to do bodily injury to Rosa or
that he caused a substantial risk of or did cause bodily injury to Rosa. It did not mean
that he did not have the intent to do bodily injury to someone when he entered the
apartment. Moreover, it did not mean that he did not attempt or threaten to do bodily
injury to someone other than Rosa or that he did not cause a substantial risk of or did not
cause bodily injury to someone other than Rosa. In fact, the State presented evidence to
show that defendant and his friends injured Adrian, Jorge Ramirez, and Jose Luis during
assaults at the apartment and when fleeing from the scene. The verdicts are not
inconsistent.
C.

In any event, inconsistent verdicts do not require reversal.
Furthermore, even assuming that the verdicts were inconsistent, that "alone is not

sufficient to overturn [a] conviction." State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App.
1994). Rather, the question on review of such a claim is simply whether the evidence
suffices to support the jury verdict. State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986).
Review for sufficiency of the evidence "should not be confused with the problems caused
by inconsistent verdicts." Id. The State's burden is to "convince the jury with its proof
and to "satisfy the courts that given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting United States v. Powell, 469
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U.S. 57, 65 (1984)). "This review should be independent of the jury's determination that
evidence on another count was insufficient." Id. (quoting Powell, 469 U.S. at 67).
"Further safeguards against jury irrationality are [not] necessary." Id. (quoting Powell,
469 U.S. at 67).
In other words, while a conviction will be reversed where the evidence, viewed in
a light favorable to the verdict, is insufficient to support the verdict, a conviction will not
be reversed because the guilty verdict underlying the conviction may be inconsistent with
an acquittal on another count. The United States Supreme Court has explained that
"[inconsistent verdicts .. . present a situation where 'error,' in the sense that the jury has
not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose
ox has been gored." Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. The jury may have properly reached its
guilty verdict "and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an
inconsistent conclusion" on some other count. Id. The prosecution, however, "has no
recourse if it wishes to correct" such error; it "is precluded from appealing or otherwise
upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause." Id.
Thus, "[t]he most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not
show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt." Id. (quoting Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has "rejected], as imprudent and
unworkable, a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent
verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of
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some error that worked against them." Id. at 66. The Utah Supreme Court has also
rejected such a rule. See Hancock, 874 P.2d at 134 ("In Utah, 'it is generally accepted
that the inconsistency of verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts
aside.'") (quoting Stewart, 729 P.2d at 613-14). Rather, a defendant must show that
"there was [not] sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,"
that the defendant committed the crime for which he was convicted. See Stewart, 729
P.2dat614.
Thus, defendant's claim that the verdicts were inconsistent fails. The verdicts
were not inconsistent. Even if they were, an inconsistency would not of itself require
reversal of the conviction based on the guilty verdict. Rather, defendant would have to
establish that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, was
insufficient.
Defendant claims insufficiency of the evidence in another point of his argument.
The State addresses that claim below.
II.
DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH MANIFEST INJUSTICE
WHERE HE AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS:
MOREOVER,
COUNSEL WAS NOT
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS,
WHICH PROPERLY SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND THE ENHANCEMENT
Defendant next claims that his conviction for aggravated burglary "was based
upon jury instructions that did not adequately define the first degree felony offense and
failed to instruct of specific intent." Appellant's Br. at 23 (capitalization and boldface
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omitted). Defendant objects specifically to jury instructions 26, 33, 34, and 35 (attached
in Addendum B). See id. at 23-33.
A.

Defendant invited any error, thereby foreclosing review of his unpreserved
claim for manifest injustice.
Defendant acknowledges that his claim his unpreserved. See id. at 23. He claims,

however, that this Court may review his claim under the doctrine of "manifest injustice."
See id. Because defendant invited any error in the jury instructions, review for manifest
injustice does not lie.
"While a party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction
assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim P. 19(e), a party
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court
into committing the error." State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, either
by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection
to the jury instruction.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111).
Utah courts "have recognized a number of ways in which a defendant has led a
trial court into committing error." Id. at ^j 10. A defendant invites error "where his
counsel confirm[s] on the record that the defense ha[s] no objection to the instructions
given by the trial court." Id. He invites error "when he fail[s] to object to an instruction
when specifically queried by the court." Id. He also invites error when "his proposed
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jury instruction effectively le[ads] the trial court into adopting the erroneous jury
instruction that he now challenges on appeal." Id. at \ 12.
Here, the trial court and the parties conducted off-the-record discussions of the
jury instructions. The court then asked the parties "to make a record as to the instructions
that were or were not given." R206:265. The prosecutor stated that he "believe[d] the
instructions given were appropriate." R206:265-66. The court observed that some
changes had been made in the instructions pursuant to requests from defense counsel.
R206:266. The court also observed that, in those instances where changes had been
requested, but not made, the court had noted on the instructions why they had not been
given. Id. Defense counsel then stated, "My only objection, your Honor, would be to
instruction number 36. It's duplicative of instruction 40,1 believe." Id. Defense counsel
thereby affirmatively represented to the court that he had no objection to any other
instruction in its final form. By so doing, he invited any error as to the instructions he
now claims were erroneous. For this reason, the jury instructions about which he now
complains may not be assigned as error even if they constitute manifest injustice.
B.

Defendant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective.
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not "requesting]

appropriate instructions." Appellant's Br. at 29. This claim also fails.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both prongs
of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which
holds that such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his counsel's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's
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performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687-88; see also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d
810, 814 (Utah App.1994). To demonstrate prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
A defendant's burden is extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can
"succeed[ ] only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from
counsel's actions." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App.1995) (citation and
quotations omitted). Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,
Tf 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations omitted).
1.

The instructions accurately and adequately defined the elements of
aggravated burglary, including the necessary intent. Counsel therefore had
no reason to submit different instructions, and his performance did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness or prejudice defendant.
As explained below, the instructions were not erroneous. Defendant therefore had

no reason to request different instructions. His performance was neither deficient nor
prejudicial.
Defendant claims that the jury instructions did not adequately define aggravated
burglary. Specifically, he claims that the instructions did not define the intent necessary
to commit the crime and that they gave the jury "the option of convicting [him] as if he
was present with other parties who may have intended to enter the residence to commit
an assault or carry a knife, merely because of association.55 Appellant's Br. at 29-30. He
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claims that he "never had any specific intent to fight when he went to the apartment and
[therefore] never committed a First Degree Felony." Id. at 30.
The jury instructions, however, were clear. Instruction 26 stated that to find
defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, the jury had to find that he "entered or remained
unlawfully . . . in a building or any portion of a building . . . with the intent to commit a
felony, theft, or an assault on any person":
To convict the defendant on count 1, AGGRAVATED
BURGLARY you must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1.
That on or about January 1, 2006,
2.
in the State of Utah,
3.
the defendant, as party to the offense,
4.
entered or remained unlawfully
5.
in a building or any portion of a building
6.
with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any
person,
7.
and in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing,
8.
the defendant or another participant in the crime:
(a)
caused bodily injury to any person who was not a
participant in the crime,
(b)
used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon against any person who was not a participant
in the crime; or
(c)

possessed or attempted to use a dangerous weapon.

R154.
As written, the instructions required the jury to find that "defendant, as party to the
offense" had "the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any person." R154.
The instructions also defined "party to the offense" to mean "[e]very person, acting with
the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
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person to engage in conduct which constitutes [the] offense." R144. Thus, the
instructions did not permit a guilty verdict upon a finding that some other person had that
intent where defendant did not. While defendant may have been found guilty based upon
the acts of co-participants, he could not have been found guilty based upon their intent.
Thus, he was not found guilty "merely because of association" or simply because his
co-participants had the intent to enter the Ramirez apartment.
2.

Instructions 33-35 adequately set forth all elements necessary for finding that
defendant acted "in concert" with two or more others. Counsel therefore had
no reason to submit different instructions, and his performance did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness or prejudice defendant.
Defendant also objects to instructions 33-35, which he apparently claims do not

adequately set forth the mental intent required to support a finding that a defendant
committed a crime in concert with two or more persons. See Appellant's Br. at 28-33.
Relying on State v. Lopes, he argues that a jury must "fmd[], based upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, 'that all three actors . . . possessed a mental state sufficient to commit
the same underlying offense and . . . directly committed the underlying offense or

The instruction provided that defendant must have entered or remained "with the
intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any person." Defendant suggests that
the trial court had a duty to sua sponte define what acts might have constituted a felony.
In making the suggestion, defendant relies on a California case, People v. Failla, 414
P.2d 39 (Cal. 1966). That case is inapposite. It treated factual circumstances under
which the defendant may have been convicted of burglary on the basis of entering a
building with the intent to commit an act that, while wrongful or even criminal, was not a
felony or a theft or an assault. Thus, guidance from the court as to what may have
constituted a felony was required. Here, however, the evidence did not suggest that the
jury may have thought defendant committed some act that was a non-applicable
misdemeanor or non-crime and, on the basis of defendant's intent to commit that act,
found him guilty of burglary.
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solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided on[e] of the other
two actors to engage in conduct constituting] the underlying offense.5" Appellant's Br.
at 28-29 (quoting Lopes, 1999 UT 24, \ 8, 980 P.2d 191).
Defendant's claim, however, rests on the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of a
former version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1. When Lopes committed a murder in
February 1996, the 1995 version of that statute was in effect. The 1995 version did, in
fact, require "that all three actors . .. possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the
same underlying offense." Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 8. The 1995 version read in part:
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in
concert with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the
offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the
defendant and two or more of the other persons would be criminally liable
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(l)(a) & (b) (1995) (emphasis added). Section 76-2-202
stated at the time, as it does now, that a person who acts "with the mental state required
for the commission of an offense" and "directly commits the offense, [or] solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004).
In an amendment to section 76-3-203.1, effective March 14, 2000, the legislature
redefined "in concert." See 2000 Utah Laws 717. That amendment established the
current definition of "in concert," the definition applicable in January 2006 when
defendant committed the offenses for which he was convicted. The current version of the
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statute does not require that all three actors possess a mental state sufficient to commit
the same underlying offense. Rather, it provides in relevant part:
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3)
if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in
concert with two or more persons.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged,
and each of the other persons:
(i) was physically present; or
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4).
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii):
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant;
and
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a
party if he were an adult.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2006).
Thus, under the version of the statute in effect at the time of defendant's
offenses, a jury could find that a defendant acted "in concert" with other persons if
those persons aided or encouraged defendant and were physically present. See id.
Alternatively, a jury could find that a defendant acted "in concert" with other
persons if those persons "aided or encouraged" defendant and, while not
physically present, "participated as parties to any of various enumerated offenses."
See id. Even under the latter circumstances, those persons "need not have had the
intent to engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant." See
id.
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The jury instructions accurately set forth the elements. Instruction 26,
reproduced in its entirety in Addendum B, told the jury members that if they
found defendant guilty on any count, they should then determine whether
defendant acted "in concert with two or more persons." R147. Instruction 34,
also reproduced in its entirety in Addendum B, defined "in concert with two or
more persons" tracking the language of the statute relevant at the time of the
offense. See R145. It also defined "party to the offense" in the language of the
section 76-2-202. See R144.
The instructions were accurate. Because the instructions were accurate,
defense counsel was not deficient for not objecting to them, and defendant
suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's not objecting.

Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for "allowing] the issue
of gang enhancement to be submitted at the same time as the issue of accomplice liability
to the underlying charges." Appellant's Br. at 33. He asserts that "this procedure . . .
caused an improper verdict." Id. This claim contains no legal support and no analysis. It
is inadequately briefed, and this Court should therefore decline to review it. See Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant's brief to set forth an argument that "contain[s]
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also State v.
Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 15, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998)) ("'It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed.'"). In any case, the verdict forms told the jury members to first
consider whether defendant was guilty on each count and to make a special finding about
whether defendant did or did not act "in concert" with others "only if [they] ha[d] found
the Defendant guilty" on the count. See Rl 66-69. Thus, the jury deliberated twice on
each count of conviction. Defendant does not explain how or why this procedure would
have caused an improper verdict.
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III.
DEFENDANT WHO, WITHOUT REASON, FAILED TO MAINTAIN
CONTACT WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL, HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MORE FULLY
CONSULTING WITH HIM DURING PREPARATION FOR TRIAL
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not preparing more fully for
trial. Specifically, he claims that counsel's "acknowledgement. . . that he needed
additional time to prepare and had not been sufficiently in contact with [defendant]"
evidenced ineffective assistance. Appellant's Br. at 34.
Defendant has not adequately briefed this issue. While his brief sets forth the
Strickland standard for making out an ineffective assistance claim, he cites no authority
for his claim that counsel was deficient for not finding and contacting defendant when
defendant failed to keep in contact. Thus, his claim is inadequately briefed, and this
Court should decline to review it. In any case, defendant has not met the Strickland
standard. He has shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
Proceedings below. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to continue trial
because he "had not had an opportunity to adequately discuss and prepare for the case"
and "hadn't been in contact with [his] client." R205:7. The trial court denied the motion,
finding that defendant was responsible for the lack of contact. The court found, "It is
clear that the Defendant had for a period of time not kept in contact with his counsel."
R205:8. The court further found that there had "been no evidence presented . . . that the
Defendant was in any way unable to make contact with his counsel." R205:8. The court
found that defendant had "retained counsel from the very beginning of this case," but that
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defendant "had for a period of time not kept in contact with his counsel." R205:8. The
court ruled that defendant had a duty to maintain contact with his counsel and found that
he had no legitimate reason for not doing so. R205:9. Nothing in the court's findings or
in the record suggests that counsel was responsible for the lack of contact.
Analysis. Defendant claims that counsel was deficient for not contacting him and
suggests that he was prejudiced. See Appellant's Br. at 33-34. He does not, however,
dispute the trial court's findings that he, not counsel, was responsible for the lack of
contact. See id. Defendant's claim is therefore defeated by the facts as found by the trial
court.
Further, the claim is without record support. Nothing in the record suggests that
counsel did not attempt to contact defendant. Nothing in the record suggests what
information counsel might have obtained from defendant that would have changed his
defense or made a difference in the result. Thus, the record supports neither a
determination that counsel was deficient nor a determination that defendant was
prejudiced. Because defendant has not provided a record adequate to support his claim,
this court must presume that counsel performed effectively. See State v. Litherland, 2000
UT 76, Tf 17, 12 P.3d 92 (stating that a defendant bears the burden of proof on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that when the record is "inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor
of a finding that counsel performed effectively").
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IV.
BECAUSE THE STATE PRODUCED EVIDENCE CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH THE
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY COUNT AND THE GANG
ENHANCEMENT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the
aggravated burglary count, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that defendant intended to enter the apartment. Appellant's Br. at 36. He also argues
that the evidence did not support a finding that the aggravated burglary was committed in
concert with two or more persons. Id.
Proceedings below. After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict
on count 1 (aggravated burglary), count 3 (assault on Ruben Ramirez), and count 4
(assault on Fiorina Chavez). R206:64. Defense counsel argued that the State had not
"presented evidence that the defendant had intent to commit a felony, a theft or an
assault, as required by Count 1." R206:95. Counsel also argued that the State had not
"show[n] that [defendant] possessed a dangerous weapon, used it, or threatened with a
dangerous weapon." Id. Counsel made no argument concerning the "in concert"
enhancement. See id.
Applicable law. "When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient
believable evidence to withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in chief, [the
reviewing court] appl[ies] the same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict. Hence,
believable evidence in this context means the evidence must be capable of supporting a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 41 (internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted). "[I]f upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, [the court] will uphold the denial of a motion to
dismiss." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Analysis. At the outset, defendant's claim fails because he preserved only a
portion of his claim and did not argue any exception to the preservation rules to justify
review of the unpreserved portion. It fails also because defendant did not marshal the
evidence in support of the findings he now challenges on appeal.
Defendant preserved this claim only with respect to the issue of whether defendant
entered the apartment with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. He did not
claim below that the evidence was insufficient to support the "in concert" enhancement
and makes no plain error or exceptional circumstances argument to justify review on
appeal. This Court may therefore decline review of defendant's claim regarding the
enhancement. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45 (stating that court may refuse to consider
unpreserved issue where defendant does not articulate exception to preservation rules).
Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
aggravated burglary charge is a challenge to a trial court's finding. If a challenge is made
to a finding, an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the
trial court and then demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of fact. See State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108 (stating that an appellant wishing to
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challenge a trial court's findings of fact must not only marshal the evidence in support of
the findings, but also "show that the trial court's findings so lack support as to be against
the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous") (quotations and
citations omitted). "If an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, any
attempt by defendant to "marshal" his evidence by listing it in an addendum does not
comply with the marshaling requirement. SeeA.K. &R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating
v. Aspen Const, 977 P.2d 518, 525 (Utah App. 1999). An "addendum does not include a
properly focused marshaling of the evidence supporting particular findings under attack,
but rather is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in the record." Id. Thus, listing
evidence in the addendum does not meet the marshaling requirement.
Defendant did not marshal the evidence. See Appellant's Br. at 35-36. While he
refers to evidence set forth in his addendum, the addendum simply contains a summary of
the testimony given at trial. See id. (Addendum at 37-60). It does not include a properly
focused marshaling of the evidence supporting the finding under attack, and it does not
meet the marshaling requirement. This Court should therefore assume the evidence
supported the findings underlying the trial court's determination. See Larsen, 828 P.2d at
490.
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In any case, the evidence presented at trial was capable of supporting a verdict that
defendant committed aggravated robbery. Specifically, the evidence sufficed to show
that defendant entered the Ramirez apartment with the intent to commit an assault.
Adrian testified that defendant had telephoned to express his anger, had stated that "[h]e
was going to f

us all," had thereafter appeared at the threshold of the Ramirez

apartment, and, immediately after the door was opened, thrust his fist into the apartment
and hit Adrian. R204:20-25. This evidence, while circumstantial as to defendant's
intent, sufficed to support a finding that he entered with the intent to commit an assault.
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,126, 10 P.3d 346 (noting that "intent is rarely
established by direct evidence," stating that it "may be proven by circumstantial
evidence," and holding that a reviewing court "must look to the circumstantial evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to determine whether the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make
the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Moreover, the evidence sufficed to show that in the course of committing or
fleeing the burglary, defendant personally caused bodily injury to Adrian. See
R204:38-40 (State's evidence that defendant used a knife to cut Adrian while leaving the
burglary site). That sufficed to establish aggravated robbery.
Further, defendant, as a party to the crime, was also liable for Jorge Urias's use or
threatened use of the knife and his other friends' use or threatened use of broken bottles
in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing from the burglary. See RR204:109,
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111, 115, 117 (State's evidence that Jorge waved his switchblade at the Ramirez family
members, that Jorge Urias, Angel, and La Diabla all carried broken bottles at the time
they entered the Ramirez apartment, and that Angel used a bottle to cut Jorge Ramirez
three times). That alternatively sufficed to establish aggravated robbery.
The evidence was also sufficient to support a finding that defendant acted in
concert with two or more other persons. Adrian testified that defendant was accompanied
by at least four friends. R204:29; State's Exhibit 2. After defendant had thrust his fist
into the apartment and punched Adrian, one of defendant's friends stepped inside the
apartment and pulled Adrian out into the hallway where defendant continued beating
him. R204:26-28. The other three friends entered the apartment carrying broken bottles
and began fighting with Adrian's brother and cousin. R204:109. After Adrian ran away
and hid under the truck, defendant and his friends found him and all of them hit him.
R204:37.
This testimony sufficed to support an inference that defendant "was aided or
encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the [aggravated burglary] offense
and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(l)(b). In addition, it sufficed to show that each of the other persons "was
physically present," thus fulfilling one of the two alternative additional statutory
requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(l)(b)(i).
Thus, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss at the end of the State's
case. The State had presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the
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elements of the crime and the enhancing circumstances had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
V.
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND THE
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE IN
CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PEOPLE
Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict on
the aggravated burglary count and the finding that defendant committed the felony in
concert with two or more others. Appellant's Br. at 36.
Defendant has inadequately briefed this claim also. He has not indicated whether
it was preserved below.4 See Appellant's Br. at 36-37. He has not argued any exception
to the preservation rule to justify review of his claim on appeal. See id. For these
reasons, this Court should not review this claim.
Moreover, while defendant has again referenced the summary of testimony set
forth in his addendum, he has failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the
jury verdict. See id. For this reason, even if this Court should grant review, it should
assume the record supports the jury verdict.
In any case, the evidence again sufficed. When reviewing a jury verdict, an
appellate court "reviewfs] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway,

Nor has the State in its review of the record been able to locate any place where
defendant preserved this claim.
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2002 UT 124, Tf 15, 63 P.3d 94. The court "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, as explained under Point IV, above, the State presented sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant had the requisite intent to commit
aggravated burglary and its finding that defendant acted with two or more persons.
Defendant's only remaining claim appears to be that the evidence did not support a
finding that he "entered" the apartment. The evidence showed, however, that both
defendant and his friends physically entered the Ramirez apartment. When Adrian
opened the apartment door, defendant thrust his arm into the apartment to hit Adrian. See
R204:24-25. This sufficed to support a finding that defendant himself entered the
apartment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(4) (West 2004) ("Enter" means .. .
"[ijntrusion of any part of the body" or "[i]ntrusion of any physical object under control
of the actor."); State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 558 (Utah 1985) (holding that intrusion
of defendant's head, hands, and arms through a window constituted an entry). In
addition, the evidence showed that after defendant thrust his hand into the apartment, his
friends entered the apartment, pulled Adrian into the hallway, and began fighting other
family members inside the apartment. See R204:26-27, 105. The finding that defendant,
as a party to the crime, entered the apartment is supportable on the basis of the entry by
other parties to the crime. See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994)
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(affirming aggravated burglary conviction of defendant where co-participants entered
home while defendant waited at another location).
VI.
BECAUSE HE CANNOT SHOW THAT A BIASED JUROR SAT,
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS CLAIM THAT THE
TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN GRANTING OR DENYING A
MOTION TO STRIKE A JUROR FOR CAUSE
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred when it granted the State's
motion to strike Juror No. 3 for cause "based upon the fact that she had young children
and the fact that she had an uncle and a friend who she believed were wrongfully
convicted." Appellant's Br. at 37. He further claims that the trial court "committed plain
error by denying [his] equivocal challenge of Juror 10 for cause, and by failing to sua
sponte remove Juror 10 for cause." Id. at 38. He cannot prevail on these claims because
he has not demonstrated that a biased juror sat.
Proceedings below. After voir dire, the State moved to strike Juror No. 3 for
cause. R205:130. Defense counsel objected. Id. The trial court granted the motion,
finding that the juror was "internally conflicted in light of her experience and has ongoing
doubts about the ability of the justice system to bring forward facts that are and should be
considered relevant to her determination." R205:131-132.5

5

The trial court also removed on its own motion Juror No. 28, who had a nephew
in prison and was "clearly conflicted," believed that her nephew had been convicted and
imprisoned by a jury that did not know all the facts, and would "continue to think about
[her nephew's] situation in this trial." R205:137. Defense counsel "objected] for the
sake of objecting because [he] th[ought] she would be a good juror." Id. Defendant
mentions the removal of Juror 28 in his brief, but does not claim that the trial court erred
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Applicable law. "Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. When reviewing such a ruling, [the appellate court]
reverse[s] only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d
283, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah App.
1994)) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted). "If a defendant
believes the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror for cause, in order to preserve the
error on appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is
available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause." Id. (quoting State v.
Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997)). Moreover, "[e]ven if the trial court has
erroneously granted or denied a challenge for cause,... to prevail on a claim of error . . .
a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial
or incompetent." Id. (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 400 (Utah 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Analysis. Defendant has inadequately briefed his claim. While arguing that the
trial court denied his "equivocal challenge to Juror No. 10 for cause," defendant has not
cited to any place in the record where he made such a challenge.6 See Appellant's Br. at
38. Neither has set forth any reason why he might have challenged Juror No. 10 or any
reason for his claim that the trial court should sua sponte have removed that juror. See id.

in removing her. If defendant intended to make some claim of error with respect to this
juror, he has not articulated the nature of his claim, and it is therefore inadequately
briefed.
6

Nor has the State in its review of the record been able to locate any place where
defendant made such a challenge.
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Thus, his claim of error as to Juror 10 is indiscernible. It is inadequately briefed, and this
Court need not review it.
Moreover, as to Juror No. 3, defendant has not explained the rationale for the
court's granting the State's challenge of Juror No. 3 for cause nor has he explained why
the rationale was faulty. See id. at 37-38. He has not set forth the law applicable to
review of a trial court's decisions regarding challenges for cause. See id. at 37-39. For
these reasons, this claim, like the claim regarding Juror No. 10, is inadequately briefed,
and this Court need not review it.
In any case, the claims fail on the merits. A defendant who claims that a trial
court plainly erred in granting or denying a motion to strike a juror for cause must show
that a biased juror sat. Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 283 (citing Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398, 400).
Defendant has not alleged, much less demonstrated, that any member of the selected
panel was biased. Thus, he cannot prevail on his claim of error based on the trial court's
granting of or denying of challenges for cause.
VII.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY DRAWN FROM A FAIR
CROSS-SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY IS UNTIMELY
Defendant claims that he "was denied a fair jury panel containing Hispanic
persons." Appellant's Br. at 39 (capitalization and boldface omitted). Defendant cannot
succeed on this claim, which is untimely and lacks record support.
Applicable law, A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right "to an impartial jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 338
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(Utah 1993) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1975); Hoytv. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961)). "[J]ury wheels,
pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically
exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably
representative thereof." Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,"
a defendant must show first "that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive9 group
in the community"; second, "that the representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community"; and third, "that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process." Id. at 364.
To establish the existence of a distinctive group, the first prong, a defendant must
show "that a particular group [is] of sufficient numerosity and distinctiveness to be
cognizable for fair cross-section purposes." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575-76 (Utah
1987). To establish the second prong, the defendant must "demonstrate the percentage of
the community made up of the group alleged to be underrepresented" and show that that
percentage of the venires made up by the group is "not fair and reasonable." Duren, 439
U.S. at 364. Finally, to demonstrate the third prong, systematic exclusion, the defendant
must show that the "discrepancy occurred not just occasionally," but that it was "inherent
in the particular jury-selection process utilized." Id. at 366.
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Once a defendant has made a prima facie case showing an infringement of his
right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section, the State "bears the burden of justifying
this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a
significant state interest." Id. at 368. If the State demonstrates a significant state interest,
the State must also demonstrate that exemptions furthering that interest caused the
challenged underrepresentation. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reemphasized that issues of jury
composition must be raised before a jury is sworn. "In all of this court's decisions since
[State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991)], we have never deviated from the rule that a
challenge to the composition of the jury must be raised before the jury is sworn in. .. . It
has therefore long been the law in Utah that constitutional challenges to the composition
of the jury—both [to] the venire and to the selected jury—must be raised before the jury
is sworn." State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, \ 35, 140 P.3d 1219 (citations omitted).
Analysis. At the outset, defendant cannot prevail on this claim because it is
untimely. "[A] constitutional challenge to the jury selection process—whether it be to
the entire venire or to the jury selected to try the case—must be brought before the jury is
sworn." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^J 37. Because defendant raises his claim for the first time
on appeal, his claim is untimely.
Moreover, the claim is without record support. Defendant has presented no
evidence of the numerosity of Hispanics in the community from which the venire was
drawn, the percentage of Hispanics in the population, the percentage of Hispanics injury
pools, or the systematic exclusion of Hispanics from the venires from which jury panels
40

are selected. See Appellant's Br. at 39-41. Thus, defendant has not demonstrated a
prima facie violation of his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community.7
VIII.
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS UNPRESERVED
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD SUA SPONTE HAVE
DECLARED A MISTRIAL
During cross-examination by defense counsel, Jorge Ramirez volunteered the
following statement: "I am afraid .. . [b]ecause [defendant] has threatened my wife and
we have a little girl and [defendant] has threatened her with her life." R204:127.
Defendant moved to strike the statement, and the trial court struck it as "not responsive to
the question that was posed." R204:127-28. Defendant made no further objections or
requests. He did not request a mistrial, and he did not ask for a cautionary instruction.
On appeal, defendant now claims that the trial court should not only have stricken
the statement from the record, but should sua sponte have declared a mistrial because
"the inherent prejudice was unfair and created a presumption that the Appellant was a
person of bad character." Appellant's Br. at 42.

7

Defendant suggests in passing that defense counsel was ineffective for not
raising a fair-cross-section challenge. See Appellant's Br. at 40. This claim is
inadequately briefed. In any case, the record is inadequate to show that defendant could
have established a fair-cross-section violation, had he challenged the jury selection
process below. A defendant bears the burden of proof on an ineffective assistance claim
and when the record is "inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92.
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Defendant's claim was not preserved below. The preservation rule "applies to
every claim, including constitutional questions," unless an appellant alleges and
demonstrates "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, ^j 11, 10 P.3d 346. Defendant has neither alleged nor demonstrated exceptional
circumstances or plain error. This Court should therefore decline to review his claim.
Moreover, defendant has inadequately briefed his claim. He has cited no support
for his claim that a trial court has the duty to sua sponte declare a mistrial under any
circumstances, let alone under the circumstances of this case. See Appellant's Br. at
41-42. Thus, his claim is inadequately briefed. As explained above, this Court will not
address arguments that are inadequately briefed. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^[ 15,
99P.3d820.
In any case, defendant could not prevail on this claim even had he argued plain
error and adequately briefed his claim. A trial court seldom has a duty to sua sponte
declare a mistrial. Some jurisdictions have simply held that in general trial courts have
no duty to sua sponte declare mistrials. See, e.g., Zachary v. State, 188 S.W.3d 917, 920
(Ark. 2004); State v. Young, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Other
jurisdictions have clarified that although courts may have the authority to sua sponte
declare mistrials, that authority is "subject to the constraints of the defendant's right to
have his trial completed by a particular jury." March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 717 (Alaska
1993).
This Court has stated that "declaring mistrials sua spont[e] . . . must be indulged
with a high degree of caution and circumspection on the part of a trial judge." State v.
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Dennis, 385 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1963) (addressing claim that trial court should sua
sponte have declared a mistrial after defense counsel stated to jury that defendant had
confessed and would repeat confession on the stand). This Court suggested that any duty
to sua sponte declare a mistrial would arise only if the underlying error had "render[ed]
the trial a 'farce and a mockery."' Id. at 154 n.2 (citing People v. Dupree, 319 P.2d 39
(1957)).
To impose a duty upon trial courts to sua sponte declare mistrials in criminal cases
may put them in a position where they are "damned if they do" and "damned if they
don't." On the one hand, failure to declare a mistrial may constitute reversible error. On
the other hand, declaring a mistrial may result in a double jeopardy violation. One court
explained the dilemma in this way:
Appellate courts are wary of claims that a trial court erred in failing to
declare a mistrial sua sponte in a criminal case. That is because generally,
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States bars retrial if a judge grants a mistrial in a criminal case
without the defendant's request or consent. Consequently, a judge who
declares a mistrial in a criminal case sua sponte may thereafter be
confronted by the defendant's contention that he cannot be retried.
Reversing convictions because trial courts fail to declare mistrials sua
sponte allows defendants to remain mute when incidents unfavorable to
them occur during trial, gamble on the verdict, then obtain a new trial if the
verdict is adverse. This puts trial courts in an untenable position and is
contrary to the principle that an appellate court will not, on review, convict
a trial court of error on an issue which was not put before it to decide.
State v. Derrick, 965 S.W.2d 418, 420 n.l (Mo. App. 1998).
Utah cases illustrate circumstances where a trial judge, intending to ensure that a
trial was fair, has sua sponte declared a mistrial, only to have a subsequent prosecution
dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. See State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979),
43

overruled on other grounds by State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, 104 P.3d 1250; West Valley
City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, 981 P.2d 420.
Furthermore, even if in some circumstances a trial court has a duty to sua sponte
declare a mistrial, such circumstances did not exist in this case. Before sua sponte
declaring a mistrial, a trial court must determine that a "manifest necessity for declaring a
mistrial exists." Patten, 1999 UT App 149,fflf12-13. The court must also determine that
"there are no alternatives to a mistrial." Id. at ^[ 13.
Here, there was an alternative. The trial court could have stricken, and in fact did
strike, the witness's volunteered statement. The jury was instructed that where "an
objection is sustained the evidence is not admitted and you should not consider it." R46
(uppercase omitted).
Jurors are presumed to obey instructions. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273
(Utah 1998) (adopting the standard set forth in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8
(1987): "[W]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an 'overwhelming
probability5 that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah
1994) ("We generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given it."); State v.
Devey, 2006 UT App 219, ^ 16, 138 P.3d 90 (denying defendant's motion for new trial
based on presumption that jurors would follow instruction).
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Nothing in this case suggests an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was
unable to follow the court's instruction or that mention of the stricken testimony was
"devastating" to the defendant. Thus, this Court may presume that the jury followed the
trial court's instruction to disregard the stricken testimony volunteered by the witness.
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial not only had no duty to sua sponte
declare a mistrial, but, even had defendant moved for a mistrial, could properly have
exercised its discretion to deny the motion. Thus, defendant has demonstrated no
"manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial."
IX.
BECAUSE DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, HE CANNOT ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL
COURT PLAINLY ERRED FOR NOT SUA SPONTE GIVING A
LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS
Defendant claims that the trial "court erred in failing to instruct as to the lesser
included offense of trespassing." Appellant's Br. at 42. Defendant did not request a
lesser included instruction below, and his claim is therefore unpreserved. He has neither
alleged nor demonstrated exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal. This Court
should therefore decline to review his claim. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, ^} 50, 58.
In any case, plain error does not lie because defendant invited any error. As
explained above, defendant affirmatively approved the jury instructions as given with the
exception of Jury Instruction 36, which he asserted was duplicative. Thus, he invited any
error in the remaining instructions, and review for plain error does not lie. Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 1 6 4 9 (siting Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54).
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X.
BECAUSE DEFENDANT MAKES NO NON-SPECULATIVE
ALLEGATION OF FACTS AND PROVIDES NO LEGAL SUPPORT
FOR HIS REQUEST THAT THIS COURT RECONSIDER ITS
EARLIER DENIAL OF HIS RULE 23B MOTION FOR REMAND,
THIS COURT SHOULD DENY IT
Defendant asserts "the necessity of additional testimony concerning the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel" and "submits that [this Court] should reconsider the
denial of the Motion to Remand the case for hearing." Appellant's Br. at 44.
After the record was filed in this case, defendant moved for a remand under rule
23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record with findings
necessary to a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This Court
denied the motion, holding that defendant's "motion [wa]s simply too speculative to
require a remand" and that it would be "improper to remand a claim under rule 23B for a
fishing expedition." Order, dated May 31, 2007 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
A remand is available only upon a "nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that
counsel was ineffective," that is, that defense counsel's performance was deficient and
the defendant was prejudiced. Utah R. App P. 23B.
While defendant now asks this Court to reconsider its denial of the motion, he
does not provide any nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record,
to support the motion. He does not explain why this Court erred when it denied his
original motion. He does nothing more than assert that his appellate brief shows "the
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entire context of the matter and the necessity of additional testimony concerning the issue
of ineffective assistance." Appellant's Br. at 44.
o

Defendant has not supported his motion for reconsideration. This Court should
therefore deny it.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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Moreover, defendant has cited no provision of the appellate rules that permits
reconsideration of the denial of a Rule 23B motion for remand.
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§ 7 6 - 2 - 2 0 2 . Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for
conduct of another
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-202.
Cross References
Crime victims' reparations, see § 63-25a-402.
Criminal solicitation, elements, see § 76-4-203.
Obstruction of justice, see § 76-8-306.
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§76-3-203.1

PUNISHMENTS
was obvious from the record that defendant had
pleaded guilty to the offense of attempted theft
of property from the person of the complaining
witness and not to offense of attempted theft, it
was not necessary that evidence be presented as
to value of property which defendant attempted
to steal, and defendant was properly sentenced
to an indeterminate term, despite defendant's
contention that he had been sentenced for attempted theft and, therefore, maximum sentence could not be in excess of six months
because property involved was worth less that
$100. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-103(2), 76-3-203(2),
76-6-412, 76-6-412(a)(iv). Henline v. Smith,
1976, 548 P.2d 1271. Larceny <S=> 88
4.

Sex offenses
One to fifteen-year sentence imposed on defendant convicted of rape was proper statutory
penalty for offense and sentence would not be
reversed and modified since it was not clearly
excessive or abuse of trial court's discretion,
notwithstanding that, prior to defendant's attempted escape from courtroom, trial judge had
stated his intention to defer sentencing until
after evaluation period, but rescinded recommendation for evaluation after the escape attempt.
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203,
76-3-404,
76-5-402. State v. Gerrard, 1978, 584 P.2d
885. Rape<®=>64
Where, in prosecution for aggravated sexual
assault, only matter relied upon by State as an
aggravating circumstance was fact that victim
was under 14 years of age, and, at time of
offense, rape statute provided that male commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with
female, not his wife, without her consent and
that rape is a felony of second degree and
another statute provided that an act of sexual
intercourse is without consent when victim is
under 14 years of age, defendant should have
been sentenced pursuant to statute relating to

second-degree felony, one to 15 years, rather
than pursuant to statute relating to first-degree
felony, five years to life, since there were two
statutes which prohibited same conduct but imposed
different
penalties.
U.C.A.1953,
76-3-203(1, 2), 76-5-402, 76-5-405, 76-5-406;
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-405(l)(b), Laws 1973, c. 196.
State v. Loveless, 1978, 581 P.2d 575. Rape C»
64
Where new penal code was enacted after defendant perpetrated sodomy but before he was
sentenced, defendant could not complain because he was sentenced under new code where
sentence received was lesser than that which
would have been warranted under old law.
U.C.A.1953,
76-1-103,
76-3-203(2),
76-3-204(2), 76-5-403(1-3), 76-53-22. State
v. Atkinson, 1975, 532 P.2d 215. Criminal Law
®» 1165(3)
5.

Review
State was not precluded from raising for first
time on appeal issue whether trial court imposed illegal sentence upon revocation of probation; under Rules of Criminal Procedure court
may correct illegal sentence at any time.
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203(2); Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 22(e). State v. Peterson, 1994, 869 P.2d
989. Criminal Law <3=> 1042
Defendant who was charged and convicted of
aggravated burglary but whose motion to enter
judgment of conviction for next lower category
of offense was granted by court resulting in him
being convicted of attempted aggravated battery
and sentenced to statutory penalty for attempted
aggravated burglary was not entitled on appeal
to attack constitutionality of punishment for aggravated burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203(1, 2),
76-3-402(1),
76-4-102(2),
76-6-203(1 )(c).
State v. Harding, 1978, 576 P.2d 1284. Criminal Law <&=> 1136

§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 . 1 . Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons—
Notice—Enhanced penalties
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to
an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of
fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two
or more persons.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged,
and each of the other persons:
(i) was physically present; or
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4).
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii):
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(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a
party if he were an adult.
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall
cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the
defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section.
(3) The enhanced penalty for a:
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine
years and which may be for life.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510,
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518,
and 76-6-520;
(/) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
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(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and
Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that
the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
Laws 1990, c 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3,
1999; Laws 2000, c 214, § 2, eff March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c 209, § 2, eff April 30,
2001.
Cross References
Juveniles, considerations in certification hearings, see § 78-3a-603
Law R e v i e w a n d J o u r n a l C o m m e n t a r i e s
Cheney, Case Law Developments The Burden
of Proof for Imposing Utah's Group Crime Sentence Enhancement, 1998 Utah L Rev 611
(1998)
,
Dymek, Case Law Developments Utah's
Gang Enhancement Statute Found Unconstitutional in Part, 1999 Utah L Rev 1027 (1999)

Smith, Utah's Gang Enhancement Statute
Did the Legislature Create a Sentencing Factor
As It Intended or Did It Unwittingly Create an
Element of the Offense?, 2000 Utah L Rev 671
(2000)

Library R e f e r e n c e s
Sentencing and Punishment C=>89
Westlaw Key Number Search 350Hk89

C J S Criminal Law §§ 14o0, 1465, 1472,
1479, 1492, 1526, 1530

N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
In general 1
Construction and application 2
Due process 3
Guilty pleas 5
Homicide 7
Notice 4
Presumptions and burden of proof 9
Review 11
Right to jury trial 6
Severance of unconstitutional provision
Sufficiency of evidence 10

8

J

1. In general
Trial court acted in accordance with requirements of sentencmg statutes in sentencing defendant to single, enhanced minimum sentences
for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery
once gang enhancement was found appropriate,
court was not required to impose sentence first
on underlying charge and then on gang enhancement
U C A 1953,
76-3-203 l(3)(e)
(1999) State v Helrmck, 2000, 9 P 3d 164, 402

Utah Adv Rep 27, 2000 UT 70
Sentencing
And Punishment O 1050
Under "gang enhancement" statute, state is
required to prove that all three actors (1) possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the
same underlying offense, and (2) directly cornmitted the underlying offense or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intention^ t y ai( ^ e< i o n e °f t n e other two actors to engage
m
conduct constituting the underlying offense
v
J> C A ^
^™iV&
^ u ?*%
Lopes, 1999, 980 P 2d 191 365 Utah Adv Rep
17, 1999 UT 24 rehearing denied Sentencing
^ ^ Punishment C=> 94
2. Construction and application
p o r purposes of gang crime enhancement
statute, "in concert" means that the other mdividuals who participated with defendant would
be criminally liable for the offense as accomphces under accomplice liability statute U C A
1953, 76-2-202, 76-3-203 l(l)(b) State ex rei
V T , 2000, 5 P 3d 1234, 398 Utah Adv Rep 10,
2000 UT App 189 Criminal Law O 89
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moreover, its decision is informed by the understanding that the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of
the trial court and appellate court can properly
find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the trial
court. State v. Moreno, 2005, 113 P.3d 992, 525
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 200. Criminal
Law <s= 1147

992, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 200.
Sentencing And Punishment <$=> 114
Appellate court will reverse a sentence only if it
determines that a sentencing court has exceeded
its permitted range of discretion, or, stated differently, if it determines that the trial court failed to
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a
sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits;

§ 76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons—
Notice—Enhanced penalties
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an enhanced
penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or more persons.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the defendant
was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was
aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the other persons:
(i) was physically present; or
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4).
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii):
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the
same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he were
an adult.
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is subject to the
enhanced penalties provided under this section.
(3) The enhanced penalty for a:
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine years and
which may be for life.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-related
offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514,
76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;
(Z) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3,
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
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(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 7(
Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency
Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the persons
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended,
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a
different or lesser offense.
Laws 1990, c. 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c.
214, § 2, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 93, § 9, eff. May 2,
2005.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2005, c. 93 deleted "76-6-503" preceding
"76-6-504" in subsec. (4)(k).
United States Supreme Court
Multiple offenses,
cution where an act took place, see WhitIn general,
field
v. U.S., 2005, 125 S.Ct. 687.
Conspiracy, money laundering, proof of
overt act, venue provision allowing proseNotes of Decisions
gree aggravated robbery with gang enhancement
5. Guilty pleas
Defendant could be sentenced under gang en- to second degree offense without enhancement.
hancement statute, pursuant to his negotiated State v. Barrett, 2005, 127 P.3d 682, 540 Utah Adv.
guilty plea to the felony offense of committing Rep. 9, 2005 UT 88. Criminal Law <&=> 977(1)
aggravated assault in concert with two or more
In order to be eligible for extraordinary relief,
persons, without any requirement that the State
establish each element of the gang enhancement State was not required to show that trial court
statute beyond a reasonable doubt either at a trial committed gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
at which the State would prove the criminal liabili- by allegedly misapplying law governing reduction
ty of the others involved in the incident, or through of offense when it reduced by two degrees charges
guilty pleas to identical crimes by the others in- for first degree felony with gang enhancement to
volved in the incident, where defendant's guilty second degree felony without enhancement without
plea admitted every element of both the underly- prosecutorial consent; rather, State was required
ing crime and the gang enhancement. Moench v. to show only abuse of discretion, with egregiousState, 2004, 88 P.3d 353, 495 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, ness of error as merely one of several factors for
2004 UT App 57. Sentencing And Punishment <£=> Supreme Court to consider in granting relief; abro415
gating in State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 and Utah
County v. Alexanderson, 71 P.3d 621. State v.
11. Review
Trial court lacked statutory authority to reduce Barrett, 2005, 127 P.3d 682, 540 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,
by two degrees, without State's consent, first de- 2005 UT 88. Courts <£=> 207.1
§ 76-3-203.3.

Penalty for hate crimes—Civil rights violation

As used in this section:
(1) "Primary offense" means those offenses provided in Subsection (4).
(2)(a) A person who commits any primary offense with the intent to intimidate or terrorize
another person or with reason to believe that his action would intimidate or terrorize that
person is subject to Subsection (2)(b).
(b)(i) A class C misdemeanor primary offense is a class B misdemeanor; and
16
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Diagnostic evaluation which indicated that
defendant was being considered for substance
abuse program but was not serious about
changing his behavior, together with defendant's criminal record, provided sufficient basis
for sentencing defendant to statutorily prescribed period for burglary rather than placing
him in substance abuse program. State v.
Sweat, 1986, 722 P.2d 746. Sentencing And
Punishment <&=> 323
Trial court, in prosecution of defendant for
burglary, did not abuse its discretion in not
placing defendant on probation. U.C.A.1953,
76-6-202. State v. McClendon, 1980, 611 P.2d
728. Sentencing And Punishment <§=* 1844
18. Review
Burglary defendant, by requesting court-appointed counsel, waived right to claim that
counsel was ineffective when she did not raise,
either at trial or on appeal, contention that
defendant was deprived of his right to selfrepresentation, as defendant's request for counsel went beyond mere acquiescence and simple
cooperation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; U.C.A.
1953, 76-6-202(1). Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002,
43 P.3d 467, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7.
Criminal Law §=* 1137(8)
There was no reasonable likelihood that outcome of trial in which defendant was convicted
of third-degree felony burglary would have been
different absent prosecutor's improper references to alleged prior convictions of defendant
other than three prior burglary felony convictions to which he admitted, so as to justify
reversal, where evidence of guilt was not marginal and court instructed that fact witness had
been convicted of felony should be considered
only in judging credibility of testimony but did
not raise presumption that witness testified
falsely, that statements of counsel were not evidence to be considered, and that facts were to
be determined from evidence, not from speculation or conjecture.
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202.
State v. Peterson, 1986, 722 P.2d 768. Criminal Law <£=> 1171.8(2)
It would not be assumed that trial court, in
nonjury prosecution for burglary and robbery,
by not mentioning possible defense of diminished mental capacity, had not considered such
defense. U.C.A. 1953, 76-6-202, 76-6-301.
State v. Romero, 1984, 684 P.2d 643. Criminal
Law ®» 260.11(2)
In burglary prosecution, inference could be
drawn by jury from defendant's unauthorized
entry into darkened apartment by forcible
means through bedroom window during late

evening hours that defendant did so with an
intent to commit theft, and thus trial court did
not err in denying defendant's motion to reduce
charge of burglary to criminal trespass and submitting issue to the jury.
U.C.A.1953,
76-6-201(3), 76-6-202(1). State v. Brooks,
1981, 631 P.2d 878. Burglary <?=> 29
Defendant accused of burglary and larceny
could not complain that no one asked him to
explain his possession of recently stolen property. U.C.A.1953, 76-38-1. State v. Martinez,
1968, 21 Utah 2d 187, 442 P.2d 943. Burglary
<&* 42(4); Larceny <&=> 64(6)
Record on appeal from burglary conviction
failed to support defendant's claims of error in
admitting victim's testimony as to identification
of stolen items, as going to ultimate fact in
issue, in refusing to give instruction as to recently stolen property, or in denying defendant
probation. State v. Brown, 1967, 19 Utah 2d 5,
425 P.2d 405. Burglary ®» 34; Burglary <S»
46(7); Sentencing And Punishment <&* 1890
19. Post-conviction relief
Postconviction relief petitioner was procedurally barred from contending that burglary statute was unconstitutionally vague and that he
was denied the right of self-representation, as
the issues were raised for the first time in the
petition and he did not demonstrate an obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial
of
a
constitutional
right.
U.C.A.1953,
76-6-202(1). Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002, 43
P.3d 467, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7.
Criminal Law <$=> 1429(1)
Postconviction relief petitioner waived claim
that counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge burglary statute on vagueness grounds;
since petitioner filed his own briefs on direct
appeal, he could and should have raised the
issue himself at that time. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 6; U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202(1). Rudolph
v. Galetka, 2002, 43 P.3d 467, 439 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7. Criminal Law <&=> 1430
Under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, a petitioner may raise the issues he failed to raise on
direct appeal through an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal
if he was represented by the same counsel during both phases of the criminal proceedings, as
it is unreasonable in such circumstances to expect counsel to raise on direct appeal the issue
of his own ineffectiveness at trial. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6; U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202(1). Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002, 43 P.3d 467, 439 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7. Criminal Law <&>
1440(3)

§ 76—6-203. Aggravated burglary
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
32
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(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any
person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon'' has the same definition as
under Section 76-1-601.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6.
Cross References
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Body armor, increase of sentence if worn in violent felony, see § 76-3-203.7.
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq.
Enhanced penalty, certain offenses committed by prisoner, see § 76-3-203.6.
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 7 6 - 3 - 3 0 1 .
Habitual violent offenders, definition and penalties, see § 76-3-203.5.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302.
Indigent Defense Act, see § 77-32-101 et seq.
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203.
Rights of Crime Victims Act, see § 77-38-1 et seq.
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10.
Serious youth offenders, charging procedure, see § 78-3a-602.
Library References
Burglary &*2 to 10.
Westlaw Key Number
67kl0.

C.J.S. Burglary §§ 2 to 6, 11 to 22, 26 to 42.
Searches:

67k2 to

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 110, Property Intrusion and Destruction Offenses-Miscellaneous Defenses.

3 Substantive Criminal Law § 21.1, Burglary.
Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 7:32, Attempted burglary, burden of proof,
Wharton's Criminal Law § 331, In General.
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Double iAnnar^v
uouDiejeoparay
Defendant s convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery arising from
same conduct did not constitute impermissible
multiple punishment and did not violate double
jeopardy clause; charge of aggravated burglary

required proof that defendant entered or remained in building, and aggravated robbery required proof that defendant took another's
property. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Const.
Art.
1, § 12;
U.C.A.1953,
76-1-402(3),
76-6-203, 76-6-302. State v. Brooks, 1995,
9 0 8 p 2d 856
- Double Jeopardy <£=> 145
2
Consent
Consent manifested by victim when he
opened door to defendant, who he believed had
come to his house for lawful purpose, was limite d t o t h a t p u r p o s e and did not, in context of
charge of aggravated burglary, authorize defend a n t t o or
d e r victim out of house at gunpoint.
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202. State v. Bradley, 1985,
? 5 2 ?2d
874^
B
lary ^
15
3.

Elements of offense
Unlawful entry or remaining in building is not
a necessary element of aggravated burglary con-
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To convict the defendant on Count 1, AGGRAVATED BURGLARY you must believe
from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1.

That on or about January 1, 2006,

2.

in the State of Utah,

3.

the defendant, as a party to the offense,

4.

entered or remained unlawfully

5.

in a building or any portion of a building

6.

with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any person,

7.

and in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing,

8.

the defendant or another participant in the crime:
(a)

caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the crime,

(b)

used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any
person who was not a participant in the crime; or

(c)

possessed or attempted to use a dangerous weapon.

If you find from all the evidence that each and every element of AGGRAVATED
BURGLARY, as explained in this instruction has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant guilty of this offense. However, if you find that one or more of the
above elements have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant
not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In the event you find the defendant guilty on any of Counts 1 through 7, you will be
asked to determine whether defendant committed any of those counts "in concert with two or
more persons," which is defined below. If you find, from all the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted in concert with two or more persons, you will please
make that finding on the verdict form where indicated. If you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in concert with two or more persons, you will please
make that finding on the verdict form where indicated.

INSTRUCTION NO.
DEFINITIONS
1.

"ASSAULT" 76-5-102(1) means:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.

2.

"BODILY INJURY95 76-1-601(3) means:
physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

3.

"BUILDING," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means:
Any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and includes:
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.

4.

"CHILD" 76-5-109(l)(a) means:
a human being who is under 18 years of age.

5.

"DANGEROUS WEAPON" 76-1-601(5) means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonable believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or

(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.

6.

A person "ENTERS OR REMAINS UNLAWFULLY" in or upon premises when the
premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the
public and when the actor is not otherwise Hcensed or privileged to enter or remain on the
premises or such portion thereof.

7.

"ENTER" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) mtcvisloTi of any physical object \xadsc control of the actor

8.

"IN CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PERSONS" 76-3-203.1(b) and (4)(b) means:
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the
offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the other persons:
(a) was physically present; or
(b) participated as a party to any offense in
(i) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1, or
(ii) burglary and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2.
Other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the same
offense or degree of offense as the defendant. And it is not necessary that the persons
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended,
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a
different or lesser offense.

6.

"INTENTIONALLY" 76-2-103(1) means:
Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.

7.

"KNOWINGLY" 76-2-103-(2) means:
Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonabl^certain to cause the result.

8.

"PARTY TO THE OFFENSE": 76-2-202 means:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

9.

"PHYSICAL INJTJRY" 76-5-109(l)(c) means:
any injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including:
(i) a bruise or other conduction of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; or
(hi) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a
serious physical injury.

10.

"SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY" 76-5-109(l)(d) means:
any physical injury or set of injuries that:
(A) seriously impairs the child's health;
(B) involves physical torture;
(C) causes serious emotional harm to the child; or
(D) involves a substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i)

any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon, or

(ii)

any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same
person, either at the same time or on difference occasions.

INSTRUCTION NO.

IS

In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of
another, it is no defense that the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has
been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or
of a different type or class of offense or is immune from prosecution.

\
\

